“You will attain a Ukrainian State, or die in battle for it.”
-The Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist

On 22 January 2010, outgoing President of Ukraine Viktor Yuschenko made international headlines when he posthumously awarded Stepan Bandera, the notorious leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the honorary title of Hero of Ukraine.1 The reaction in Ukraine to the award was mixed, with many Western Ukrainians supporting the award, and many Eastern Ukrainians denouncing it.2

The international reaction to the award was largely negative. The Jewish human rights organization The Simon Wiesenthal Center expressed the “deepest revulsion at the recent honor.3

Polish President Lech Kaczynski stated that the decision for the award was “aimed against the process of historical dialogue and reconciliation.”4 Ukrainians such as Sergei Tigipko, a 2014 presidential candidate and fromer Vice Prime Minister in Yanukovich’s government, argued that Yuschenko’s decision to award Bandera was a strategic move to garner votes, and rally Western patriots.5

Described as racists, terrorists, fascists, and bandits, Bandera and the Ukrainian insurgency of the 1930’s-1950s, has been the subject of impassioned scholarly, political, and national debate.

Bandera and the OUN-UPA have an ambiguous role in Ukrainian history, and are seen as villains by the majority of Poles and Russians, and as hero’s by the majority of Western Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists who look to Bandera and the OUN-UPA as national heroes who paved the way for Ukrainian independence.

With the zeal and fanaticism that today’s nationalists speak about the OUN-UPA, one would think that Bandera was a charismatic leader, but Bandera and other leaders of the OUN-UPA were not outstanding orators, nor were they profound theoreticians.

They became symbols of resistance rather than actual participants, spending most of their lives in exile, prison, or concentration camps. But symbols they are nevertheless, and today their legacy rests largely on what has been done in their names rather than on how they lived their lives and what they believed.

The controversy surrounding Bandera’s legacy brought to the forefront an important issue, the politics and ideology of the Ukrainian insurgency, the OUN-UPA. Over the course of 60 years, the real story of this movement has been clouded by Soviet propaganda, Western misconceptions, and Ukrainian nationalism both within Ukraine and in the Diaspora.

This paper will analyze two inter-related movements, the National Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). I will start with OUN’s founding in 1929, the founding of the UPA in 1943 and end with the eradication of the OUN-UPA in 1956.

This chapter will show that despite vehement opposition to socialism and an affinity for fascism, the OUN-UPA changed their ideology and took advantage of every opportunity to attain an independent Ukraine.

The OUN-UPA was willing to do almost anything to achieve this goal, even if it meant compromising their positions and principles. Because of their willingness to change positions and alliances while remaining devoted to a single nationalist principle of attaining a Ukrainian state, the OUN-UPA’s ideology was closer to opportunistic integral nationalism than Nazi fascism.

The OUN was created by the veterans of the radical militant group the Ukrainian Military Organization, largely as a result of frustrations from the failures of the 1917-1920 struggles for Ukrainian independence.

Many saw the failures of 1917-1920 as the result of weak and poorly organized parties, unsuccessful ideologies, primarily socialism and Marxism.

The OUN believed that an obedient and highly organized movement centered on the nation as the goal was the ideal method by which to achieve independence. The Ukrainian Encyclopedia describes the basic policy of the statute adopted by the OUN in 1929:

According to its initial declaration the OUN’s goal was to establish an independent, united national state on Ukrainian ethnic territory. This goal was to be achieved by a national revolution led by a dictatorship that would drive out the occupying powers and set up a government representing all regions and social groups. The economy was to be a mixture of private ownership, nationalization, and co-operation. The OUN rejected all party and class divisions and presented itself as the dominant force in Ukrainian life at home and abroad. Defining itself as a movement, not a party, it condemned the legal Ukrainian parties in Galicia as collaborationist.6

The OUN was especially attracted to the developments in Italy with Benito Mussolini’s brand of fascism which had seemingly rescued Italy from chaos. The leadership saw fascism as exemplified in Italy a legitimate method of achieving a Ukrainian state.7

For PUN (The Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists), fascism was appealing not because of its racial and nationalist ideology but because of its apparent political pragmatism and success. The PUN was composed of an earlier generation with conservative tendencies who thought in terms of traditional militaristic authoritarianism.8

The majority of OUN members consisted of young, fanatic, and brash men brought up in an air of nationalism in Western Ukraine. This younger segment was composed of such future leaders as Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed, Yaroslav Stet’sko, and Roman Shukshevych who were too young to have fought in the struggle for independence, and as Orest Subtelny observed, their youthfulness and constant “exposure to foreign oppression predisposed them to a violent, heroic type of resistance and they were contemptuous of the relative moderation of their elders abroad.”9 These ideological and generational differences would later become fundamental to the organization after the assassination of the OUN’s leader Yevhen Konovalets by an NKVD agent in 1938.

These members rallied under the rather vague, contradictory, and irrational theory of integral nationalism as espoused by Ukrainian political theorist Dmytro Dontsov. Dontosv advocated the sublimation of the nation over the individual, an emphasis on national will and revolution, and that Ukraine should break away from Russian control.10

The fanatic worship of the nation as the only goal was passionately espoused not only by the OUN-UPA but other nationalist organizations, such as the Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (SUNM).

The Ukrainian nationalists articulated their sense of duty to the nation in the 1929 text “The Ten Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist,” known as the “Decalogue.” The list promoted the struggle for the nation above the individual, and self-sacrifice and martyrdom as the ideal attitude of the Ukrainian nationalist. The 1929 text reads:

  1. You will attain a Ukrainian State, or die in battle for it.

  2. You will not permit anyone to defame the glory or the honor of Your nation.

  3. Remember the Great Days of our struggles.

  4. Be proud of the fact that You are the inheritor of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr’s Trident.

  5. Avenge the deaths of the Great Knights.

  6. Do not speak about matters with whom you can, but only with whom you must.

  7. Do not hesitate to carry out the most dangerous deeds, should this be demanded by the good of the cause.

  8. Treat the enemies of Your Nation with hatred and ruthlessness.

  9. Neither pleading, nor threats, nor torture, nor death shall compel You to betray a secret.

  10. Aspire to expand the power, wealth, and glory of the Ukrainian State.11

The OUN believed that an armed struggle was the only method by which Ukraine could become independent. Beginning in late 1929 the OUN engaged in terror-acts against Polish and Soviet officials and civilians. In 1933 Bandera was entrusted with leading the OUN in Western Ukraine (ZUZ). Under Bandera’s leadership the OUN set out on a campaign of terror, attacking and killing Polish and Soviet officials, civilians, and Ukrainians who seemed suspicious or did not agree with the OUN.12

In 1935 Polish authorities arrested Bandera and the leadership of the OUN in Poland, tried them, and in an attempt not to make them into martyrs sentenced them to life in prison, where they remained until war broke out in 1939.

When Konolevets was assassinated in 1938, the leading body of the OUN (the Provid), meeting in Rome, elected Andrii Melnyk as the new leader. Melnyk was of the older generation, had fought with the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen in World War I, and was a moderate, who did not always favor violence. Though, as Paul Magocsi argues Melnyk’s close relationship with Metropolitan Sheptyt’ski and his moderate attitude appeared to a broad spectrum of Galician-Ukrainian public, his characteristics were deplored by the young, radical, military-minded, members of the OUN.13

On 10 February 1940, Bandera and his faction declared the Rome conference illegitimate and created their own faction, the OUN-Bandera (OUN-B) with Melnyk keeping a small number in his faction, the OUN-Melnyk (OUN-M).

Both the OUN-B and the OUN-M saw Nazi Germany as the only realistic catalyst for change in Europe, and shared an interest in destroying the Soviet Union.

The OUN-B was more prone to be suspicious of the Germans, whereas the OUN-M attempted not to antagonize them. Even though the Ukrainian nationalists were collaborating with the Germans, in 1939 Bandera demanded that the OUN form a military underground force that would be ready to fight against anyone, even Germans if need be, who stood in the way of Ukrainian independence.14 Nevertheless, the Germans were the only likely alliance that the Ukrainian nationalists could make in the upcoming war, a war in which the OUN-B believed Germany would come out victorious. In their reasoning, Poland and the Soviet Union were far greater enemies of the Ukrainian nation, thus aligning with Germany seemed pragmatic at the time.

In 1941 two Ukrainian military units were formed under German sponsorship, Roland and Nachtigal. According to nationalist sources, these units were intended solely for the struggle against the USSR and were never an integral part of the German army.15 In June 1941 the Nachtigal unit entered Lviv, resulting in a declaration of a sovereign Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941 by Yaroslav Stet’sko on Bandera’s behalf, a declaration which became known as the Akt. The Akt was done without the knowledge or approval of German authorities.

The Akt stated that the “by the will of the Ukrainian people, the OUN under the direction of Stepan Bandera, proclaims the formation of the Ukrainian State for which have laid down their heads whole generations of the finest sons of Ukraine.”16

It also stated: “The newly formed Ukrainian state will work closely with the National-Socialist Greater Germany, under the leadership of its leader Adolf Hitler which is forming a new order in Europe and the world and is helping the Ukrainian People to free itself from Muscovite occupation.”17

The declaration of Ukrainian independence would play a significant and decisive role in OUN-German relations. Between 30 June and 2 July, 1941, the newly formed government governed over Ukraine. Historians such as Kul’chytsk’yi and Subtelny argue that the Akt was to force Germany’s hand, that the German military commanders would accept this action as an accomplished fact, rather than risk confrontation with Ukrainians at the outset of the invasion.18

The Germans however could not stand for such an action. The Germans viewed the Ukrainian nationalists as tools rather than legitimate allies such as Italy. The establishment of the Ukrainian state went against the fundamental goals of the Nazi’s, who ideologically considered the Ukrainians inferior.19

On 5 July 1941 Bandera and Stet’sko were arrested and flown to Berlin, and later to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, where they were kept until 1944. Between August and September the Germans arrested members of the OUN-B, disbanded battalions, and by December the Gestapo began actively eliminating the group. Thus by the end of 1941 the OUN-B was being actively destroyed by the Germans.

While the Germans were cracking down on the OUN-B, the OUN-M (who did not support the Akt, and was thus not yet touched by the Germans) consolidated power in Ukraine and establishing headquarters in Kiev. But by early 1942, the Germans began attacking the OUN-M as well. The nationalists who escaped the Gestapo’s dragnet no longer had any reason to identify themselves with a fascist or Nazi “new Europe.”20 Thus by 1942 all “collaboration” between militant Ukrainian nationalists and Nazi Germany had ceased.

Though the Germans had arrested the leadership and executed many of the OUN-B/M’s prominent members, such as the poetess Olena Teliga, who was executed by the Gestapo at Babi Yar, members of the OUN-B regrouped in Galicia, and began actively engaging against the Germans, the Poles, and soon the Soviets. In early 1943, the OUN-B, the OUN-M, and Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’s UPA were fighting for control over Western Ukraine, primarily in Volhynia.21 The OUN-B emerged victorious over the factions, and appropriated the name of the UPA, which by then had become well known by the Ukrainians in the region. In August 1943, Roman Shukhevych was appointed the Supreme Commander of the UPA, the military wing of the OUN-B, headed symbolically by Bandera from Germany.

Between 1943 and 1945, the UPA fought against the Poles, the Germans, and the Soviets. Since they were fighting fascists, the OUN-UPA changed its ideology significantly. Taras Hunczak writes:

The changes were formally accepted at the Third Congress of the OUN, held in August 1943, which not only adopted the principle of democracy as the basic tenet of the future Ukrainian state but also modified its stand on the national minorities in Ukraine. The anti-Jewish resolution of the earlier congress was annulled and replaced by the provision calling for equal rights for all national minorities in Ukraine.22

The new policy accepted Jews into the ranks of the OUN. The formation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation council in July 1944, further expanded the new social-democratic platform, a platform which was more attune to the mood of the general Ukrainian population.

Between 1943 and 1944, the UPA was involved in what has become known as the Ukrainian-Polish Civil War. Based on what the UPA saw as brutal attacks on ethnic Ukrainians in the Chelm region by the Polish Home Army, the UPA began attacking Polish villages and murdering civilians without warning in 1943 in Volhynia. By June 1944, the UPA was killing Polish civilians and battling Polish partisans in every district of Galicia and by that summer there raged a “pitiless” civil war fought between the UPA and the Polish Home Army.23 It is estimated that between 1943-1944 over 50,000 Polish civilians were murdered by the UPA, under Commander Dmytro Klyachikiv’skiy. It should be noted that between 1941-1943 many members of the OUN-B had infiltrated the German police forces in Poland, and had thorough training in murdering mass numbers of people.24

From 1944 to 1945, the UPA was mostly concerned with fighting the approaching Soviet troops, primarily NKVD battalions. After Germany’s defeat in 1945, Soviet forces focused upon fully eradicating the UPA, this culminated in 1947’s Operation Vistula, an operation which resulted in the forced relocation of some 200,000 Ukrainians, Boyko, and Lemko peoples. The action was carried out by Polish Communists under the approval and direction of Moscow. Operation Vistula resulted in an incredibly weakened UPA, and by 1949 it was so weak that Shukhevych dissolved all units in 1949.

Shukhevych was killed in 1950, and even though the leader was gone, small UPA units existed and ambushed Soviet officials until 1956. According to Ukrainian historian Uryi Shapoval, a 1959 Soviet report claimed that by 1956 there was a complete “elimination of armed gangs and organized underground bourgeois nationalists.”25

Even though the UPA continued small insurgent activity up until 1956, its defeating blow came in 1947 with Operation Vistula. The fates of OUN-UPA leaders and members varied; many were shot and imprisoned, others fled to the West, and others remained in exile. Bandera, the OUN-UPA’s symbolic leader, was assassinated by a Soviet agent in Munich in 1959.

Bandera’s assassination sent a message to the Ukrainian nationalists: the Soviets had finally destroyed the “bourgeois nationalist” movement within and abroad. Nevertheless, many former UPA-OUN members joined and formed Diaspora organizations which would play an important role in the development of Ukrainian nationalism for the next 60 years, primarily The World Congress of Free Ukrainians, founded in 1967, a group which was proposed by Andrii Melnyk, former leader of the OUN-M.

Between 1945 and 1991, the Ukrainian Diaspora, which comprised of millions of Ukrainians, rallied world governments over the Ukrainian cause, using the 1932-33 Famine as a rallying point for world sympathy and recognition. Many in the Diaspora saw Ukraine’s declaration of independence in August 1991 as the fulfillment of the OUN-UPA’s dream of a Ukraine along ethnic borders.

The mythical and villainous aspects of the OUN-UPA in Ukrainian history remain the subject of impassioned debate. The 1939-1941 collaboration with Nazi Germany and the 1943-1944 ethnic cleansing of Poles have been the primary topics of dialogue concerning the organization’s political ideology.

Impassioned dialogue, however, has the ability to simplify complex aspects and is quick to label groups and movements simply based on “collaboration” and “action.” For years the OUN-UPA has been described as a fascist movement. This understanding was largely the result of Soviet propaganda and Western democratic immediate distaste for anyone associated with the terms fascism, nationalism, and Nazi-collaboration. Modern historians such as Timothy Snyder, David R. Marples, Orest Subtelny, Taras Hunczak, Bohdan Krawchenko, Roman Serbyn, Peter J. Potichnyj, John A. Armstrong, and many others, have shown that the OUN-UPA’s story is not as simple as first thought, that their ideology was subject to change, and that the concept that they were a fascist group is open to revision.

There is no doubt that from its inception in 1929, the OUN-UPA espoused a totalitarian, authoritarian, and nationalist idea for a future Ukrainian state. There is also no doubt that the OUN-UPA saw violence and Nazi collaboration as a legitimate tool against foreign and domestic enemies. As historians Timothy Snyder and David R. Marples have pointed out, the OUN-UPA emerged out of a brutal war, in a region dominated by totalitarian governments and ideology, as the most fanatical wing of the most extreme faction of Ukrainian nationalism, one that in a democratic setting could not have hoped to win the support of the majority of the population.26

The OUN’s conceptions about the nation were formulated before the Nazi’s came into power, and as John A. Armstrong has observed, like extreme Slovak Populists and the Ustasa, the OUN was influenced by Italian fascism than Nazism.27 Armstrong writes:

In any case, it is clear that the relationship of the OUN to Nazism was in no way one of affiliation but, at the most,
one of affinity. Ideological positions shared by the two movements derived from remote, and often unrecognized, intellectual sources. Since both Nazism and integral nationalism are notoriously obscure and contradictory in their ideological positions, it is extremely difficult to define these affinities.28

Unlike the Nazis, the Ukrainian nationalists fought against the Jews, Poles, and Russians not on ethnic, genetic, or religious grounds, but because they saw them as the chief enemies of an independent Ukraine. In fact it was the group that was most closely linked to the Ukrainians, the Russians, which were seen as the chief enemies, followed by the Poles, and later by the Jews, who were seen as the “most faithful supporters of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine.”29

Historian Taras Huczak has observed that after 1943 Jews participated in the OUN.30 While the Germans embraced an ideology based on race superiority, and the Communists an ideology of class conflict; the Ukrainian nationalists were primarily guided by their Decalogue, regarding the establishment of a Ukrainian state as the first priority.

Since Soviet Russia and Poland were seen as the ultimate enemy, and the leading opposition to the USSR and Poland was Nazi Germany, the OUN was a German collaborator de facto, but also out of pragmatism. Since Germany had accepted fascist Italy into their alliance, and promised a strong Italy after the war, the Ukrainians believed that a similar alliance could be made with the Germans. Unlike the Italians or the Spaniards, however, the Ukrainians lacked an actual territory, and constituted only a military insurgency with no national homeland. The Germans did not view the Ukrainians as an ally, but rather as an instrument to legitimize German rule in the early part of the war. The same argument has been used by OUN-UPA apologists, who argue that the OUN-UPA used the Germans as a tool. Thus the study of the collaboration between the two groups must distinguish the real and avowed attitudes of the two movements.

A major problem between the Nazis and the “integral nationalism” of the Ukrainians was that both groups placed absolute value on their nation, this mutual understanding of nationalism was in fact an irreconcilable ideological contradiction of interests.

Where the Germans were unwilling to compromise on the racial question, the Ukrainian nationalists were able to change their ideology and embrace other religions and ethnicities into their ranks after 1943. The ability to change and adapt exhibits that Ukrainian nationalists were less concerned with the purity of race and the nation, the most important goal was always the creation of an independent state.

Timothy Snyder has pointed out that most Ukrainians were attracted to socialism, agrarianism, and national communism than to the integral nationalism of the OUN.31 These attractions lead the OUN-UPA to transform their political program in 1943 and 1944 in order to maintain its role as the national resistance movement against totalitarianism and occupation, under the ideology of social democracy.

So what was the political ideology of the OUN-UPA? The most appropriate name would be opportunistic integral nationalism. The OUN was born out of a hatred for Polish and Imperial Russian rule, a hatred fueled by Soviet occupation and the man-made famine, and disillusionment with the failed attempts of Ukrainian socialists and Marxists.

Since socialism was a failure for Ukrainian revolutionaries, and placed class above the nation, the frustrations of young and educated Ukrainians was articulated in the theories of Dmytro Dontsov, the Decalogue, and the growing nationalist vogue of early fascism.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism and violence was a legitimate method of national, revolutionary politics, used by the communists and the fascists alike. Though the terrorism of the OUN represented the most extreme version of Ukrainian nationalism, it was not unique to Ukrainian nationalists. One-party authoritarian ideologies were not unique to the OUN-UPA as well.

Between 1929 and 1956, the ideology and tactics of the OUN-UPA changed according to the political and military makeup of the region where it operated. The organization went through several changes in leadership and competing factions. From this perspective, the OUN-UPA cannot be studied as a single movement with a single ideology and leadership. Perhaps the only ideological concept that was maintained throughout its some 20 years was the seemingly unattainable goal of an independent Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists swore by the ideology of the 1st commandment of the Ukrainian Nationalist: “You will attain a Ukrainian State, or die in battle for it.”

The battle for a Ukrainian state came above all else, and the OUN-UPA would take every opportunity available to them in order to attain this goal. The fact that OUN-UPA would change its position on ideology is evident that they were willing to adapt to circumstances and take opportunities available to them in order to achieve the state. Part of this opportunism may be because the OUN-UPA fought a two-front and at times three-front war and was limited by having no government or territory.

None of these reasons excuse the atrocities that they committed along the way. Their collaborations and massacres should be studied in the context of their goal and the circumstances of the times.

Though the OUN-UPA was always nationalistic, disciplined, and brutal in their methods, we cannot know what kind of government they would have set up if they did accomplish their goals and if they would have the support of the masses. What we do know is the OUN-UPA fought restlessly for over twenty-years in an aggressive war against Poland, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and competing Ukrainian nationalists, seizing on the opportunities which were available in the context of a war-torn region, willing to do what they viewed as sacred deeds for the establishment of an independent Ukraine, regardless of moral scruples.


 

Works Cited

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Шаповал , Юрій . ” Війна після війни .” “Воєнна історія” #5-6 за 2002 рік. http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/5_6_02_7.htm (accessed May 19, 2010).

Стецько, Ярослав . “Акт відновлення Української Держави 30 червня 1941 р. .” ОУН-УПА: легенда спротиву. http://oun-upa.org.ua/documents/akt_1941.html (accessed May 18, 2010).

Armstrong, John A.. “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe.” The Journal of Modern History 40, no. 3 (1968): 396-410.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine’s Piedmont. 1 ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002. Print.

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Footnotes

 

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  1. УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАИНЫ № 46/2010 – Официальное представительство Президента Украины.” Офiцiйне представництво Президента України. http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/documents/10353.html (accessed May 18, 2010). 

  2. See Ukraine, The EU and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations (Studies in Central and Eastern Europe). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.. 

  3. “Wiesenthal Center Blasts Ukrainian Honor For Nazi Collaborator | Simon Wiesenthal Center.” Simon Wiesenthal Center. http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=4441467&ct=7922775 (accessed May 18, 2010). 

  4. “Polish president condemns Ukrainian nationalist leader’s heroization | Top Russian news and analysis online | ‘RIA Novosti’ newswire.” RIA Novosti. http://en.rian.ru/world/20100205/157776510.html (accessed May 18, 2010).
     

  5. “Tihipko: Yushchenko made mistake by awarding Ukraine top medal to WWII nationalist leader Stepan Bandera.” ZIK: Western Information Company. http://zik.com.ua/en/news/2010/01/30/214592 (accessed May 18, 2010). 

  6. Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists .” Encyclopedia of Ukraine. www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\o\r\organizationofukrainiannationalists.htm (accessed May 18, 2010). 

  7. The OUN leadership was composed of nine men, headed by Yevhen Konovalets, and called the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN). PUN consisted of older nationalists such as Mykola Stsiborsky, Volodymyr Martynets, Dmytro Andiievsky, and Mykola Kupstiansky. 

  8. “Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.” Encyclopedia of Ukraine. http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pages/O/R/OrganizationofUkrainianNationalists.htm (accessed May 14, 2010). 

  9. Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A History. Fourth Edition ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.: 446. 

  10. Marples, David R. “Stepan Bandera: The Resurrection of a Ukrainian National Hero.” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 4 (2006): 559. 

  11. Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Canadian Library in Ukrainian Studies). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1980: 173. 

  12. In 1934 Bandera and Roman Shukhevych ordered the murders of KGB agent A. Mailov and the assassination of Poland’s Minister of the Interior Bronislaw Pieracki. During the 1935 trial of Bandera it was revealed that the OUN murdered M. Bilet’skyi, Ukrainian peasant activist who did not agree with the OUN. Bachyn’sky, a student suspected of being a provocateur was murdered by the OUN, despite showing interest in joining the organization. Babii, a Ukrainian professor at the Lviv Ukrainian Gymnasium was murdered because he forbade political activities on school premises. 

  13. Magocsi, Paul Robert. The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine’s Piedmont. 1 ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002: 33. 

  14. Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A History. Fourth Edition ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.: 459. 

  15. Marples, David R. “Stepan Bandera: The Resurrection of a Ukrainian National Hero.” Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 4 (2006): 560. 

  16. Стецько, Ярослав . “Акт відновлення Української Держави 30 червня 1941 р. .” ОУН-УПА: легенда спротиву. http://oun-upa.org.ua/documents/akt_1941.html (accessed May 18, 2010). 

  17. Ibid. 

  18. Subtelny, Orest. Ukraine: A History. Fourth Edition ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.: 464. 

  19. In Nazism, the Slavic peoples were considered Untermensch, or “sub-human.” 

  20. Potichnyj, Peter J., and Yevhen Shtendera. “LITOPYS UPA – Related Materials: Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground 1943-1951.” InfoUkes – Information Resource about Ukraine and Ukrainians. http://www.infoukes.com/upa/related/poltho.html (accessed May 19, 2010). 

  21. A separate UPA existed between 1941 and 1943 before being appropriated by the OUN-B. 

  22. Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Canadian Library in Ukrainian Studies). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1980: 41. 

  23. Snyder, Timothy. The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Ed ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004: 177. 

  24. See Snyder, Timothy. The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Ed ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004: 161-163. 

  25. Шаповал , Юрій . ” Війна після війни .” “Воєнна історія” #5-6 за 2002 рік. http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/5_6_02_7.htm (accessed May 19, 2010). 

  26. See Marples, David R.. Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine. 2nd Ed ed. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008: 150; also see: Snyder, Timothy. “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing.” Past & Present 179, no. 1 (2003): 197-234. 

  27. See Armstrong, John A.. “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe.” The Journal of Modern History 40, no. 3 (1968): 396-410. 

  28. Armstrong, John A.. “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe.” The Journal of Modern History 40, no. 3 (1968): 400-401. 

  29. Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Canadian Library in Ukrainian Studies). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1980: 41. 

  30. See “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Soviet and Nazi Occupations” in Ukraine During World War II: History and Its Aftermath (Canadian Library in Ukrainian Studies). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1980: 15-38. 

  31. Snyder, Timothy. The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999. New Ed ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004: 152.